本文主要講述的是高管的薪酬規定，此外，根據委託代理理論，建議經理人薪酬應參照基準。這一基準消除了該行業的市場或業績對公司個人業績的影響。最近有一種觀點認為，這種指數化不會在信息中被觀察到，因為高管們有能力根據個人利益設定薪酬。這意味著他們可以享受績效報酬(Shields et al.， 2015)。如果高管的薪酬與市場的波動相聯繫，那麼他們所期望的只是市場所確定的承擔風險的回報。這種觀點與這樣一個事實有關:高管薪酬不僅與厄運有關，還與好運有關。如果高管們能夠真正影響他們的薪酬設定，那麼他們將考慮對自己的業績進行基準測試。本篇代寫essay文章由英國論文人EducationRen教育網整理，供大家參考閱讀。
Furthermore, according to the theory of principal agent, it is suggested that managers need to be paid with regard to a benchmark. This benchmark removes the influence of market or performance in the sector over the individual performance of a firm. It has been, recently argued, that this type of indexation does not get observed within information as executives have the ability of setting pay within their individual interest. This implies that they can enjoy payment for performance (Shields et al., 2015). If the pay of executives is connected to the movements in the market, then they expect only to obtain the risk bearing return determined in the market. Such an argument is connected to the fact that executive based pay is connected not only to bad luck but also to their good luck. If it is possible for executives to influence truly their pay setting, then they will look at having benchmarking of their performance.
Within the basic model of principal-agent, the optimal incentive level deteriorates with the manager’s effort into costing along with the performance measure noise to signal reaction. This in turn sparks risk aversion of executives. In consistency with such statics of comparative nature, the CEO incentives variation throughout firms appear to be explained partly through the stock return variance (Selviaridis & Wynstra, 2015). CEO’s who are wealthier also have more likeliness to be less aversive to risk especially in situations with incentives highly powered. From this perspective, it becomes clear that the challenges in performance based pay also impact the executive pay setting in a negative manner. This is especially true because executives are paid even when their performance is on the lower end.
According to Lambert et al. (1987), it has been argued that compensation needs to be more closely connected to prices of stock when performance of accounting is noisier relatively (Sturman et al., 2003). Even when there is evidence consistency for bonuses, salaries and pay options, total CEO pay has the opposite result. According to Yermack (1995) and Bryan et al. (2000), no evidence was found that CEOs will obtain a better pay when their performance is high or a lower one when their performance is low. Most of the times their pay is set and it does not base itself over performance at all.