代寫論文網站：基金經理
基金經理是關鍵人員操作的投資基金。最近,“羊群行為”和“黑屏”頻繁在中國基金行業中表明有寬鬆的系統平衡約束和監督。因此,重要的是要運用激勵機制來保護利益相關者的利益,避免“降級選擇”和“道德風險”的基金經理之一。我們選擇基金經理的激勵機製作為研究課題,具有重要的理論和現實意義。首先,我們進行理論分析絕對績效激勵合同和相對業績激勵合同。
代寫論文網站：基金經理
其次,我們利用多維線性回歸模型來研究基金管理費的激勵效果。第三,我們將分析職業聲望的基金經理的激勵效果使用邏輯回歸模型通過建立0,1兩個分類變量。最後,我們研究了基金經理的風險選擇的相對性能排序。根據理論和實證分析的結論,提出了設計和完善的計劃對基金經理的激勵機制,並提出一些建議,以保障基金經理激勵機制來顯示有用的效果。
代寫論文網站：基金經理
Fund managers are the key persons in the operation of an investment fund. Recently, “herd behaviour” and “black screen” are frequent in the fund industry in China which indicate that there are loose systems of balance constrains and supervision. Therefore, it is important to apply an incentive mechanism to protect the interest of stakeholders, avoid “reversion choice” and “moral risk” among fund managers. We choose the incentive mechanism of fund managers as our research subject, which has great theoretical and practical significance.Firstly, we carry on the theoretical analysis to the absolute performance incentive contract and the relative performance incentive contract.
代寫論文網站：基金經理
Secondly, we utilize the multi-dimensional linear regression models to study the incentive effect of fund management fee. Thirdly, we would analyze professional prestige of fund managers’ incentive effect using the Logistic regression models by establishing 0, 1 two classified variables. And finally, we study the fund managers’ risk choice by the relative performance sorting. According to the conclusions of theoretical and empirical analysis, we put forward the design and the consummation plans about the incentive mechanism of fund managers, and bring forward some suggestion to safeguard fund manager’s incentive mechanism to display useful effects.