而不是减轻贫困特别是国家靠矿业发展的行业,矿业有加深的趋势长期贫困和创造发展的赤字在当地的水平和在国家水平损害了人们的健康和环境以及基于土地生计损失以及混乱的社会。建议采取适当的治理和适当的分配以及采矿收入的再投资来解决这一被称为资源诅咒的进程。但是，开发这种治理的成本可能高得令人望而却步。这是因为它导致资本的转移，而不是试图改善贫困状况。Brian等人(2011)认为，当企业发现自己的有害行为暴露在世界面前，品牌形象下降时，只有2个行动课程。首先是走一条好的道路，认真对待人们的关注，考虑专家的建议，理解如何从根本上改变企业的经营方式(Leblanc 2012, 12)。承认这些错误并最终结束这种肆无忌惮的行为也应该是恢复社区内立场的首要步骤。下一个选择是控制损失。
矿业成员没有报告结论，而是开始以非营利性部门代表的身份与成员召开一系列会议，会议最终形成了一个名为“德文郡倡议”(initiative of Devonshire)的组织。如果矿业组织为计划中的与非政府组织的合作努力买单，那么一切都将处于无害的、潜在有利的关系中(Coumans 2012, 120)。他们开始高度依赖一种空前繁荣的大宗商品，因此资金充足几乎不成问题。但是DI成员选择在加拿大游说政府通过CIDA(加拿大国际开发署)提供资金和支持。这些指定为官方发展援助的矿业公司需要资金来资助它们的企业社会责任倡议，而没有遵守任何新的规定。德文希尔倡议的方法是加拿大采掘业治理的首选方法，它描述了哈珀政府的一个软角。然而，这笔资金的附带条件是，所有矿业公司都应该与非政府组织合作，以便非政府组织能够获得任何资金。因此，该战略存在着不能促进可持续发展的弱点。
Instead of alleviating poverty particularly in nations that depend over the sector of mining for growth, mining has a tendency of deepening poverty and creating development deficits in the long term at the local levels and at national levels by damaging the health of people and their environment along with land based livelihoods loss as well as dislocation in the society. Appropriate governance and proper distribution along with mining revenue reinvestment are recommended as solution to the process referred as the curse of resources. But development of this governance can be expensive prohibitively. This is because it leads towards diversion of capital instead of trying to improve the condition of poverty.According to Brian et al, (2011), when industries find themselves faced with a reducing brand image after their harmful practices have come in front of the world, then there are only 2 action courses. First is to take a good path which takes the concern of people in a serious manner, considering the experts’ advice and understanding how to change fundamentally the way in which businesses are performed (Leblanc 2012, 12). Admitting these mistakes and finally ending the unscrupulous act should also be the initials step for recuperating the stand within the community. The next option is to control the damage.
Instead of reporting conclusions, mining industry members started initiating a meeting series with members as representatives from the sector of non-profit which eventually can culminate in the group’s formation called the initiative of Devonshire. Everything would have come under harmless and potentially advantageous relationship if the mining organizations would have footed the bill for planned collaborative efforts with NGOs development (Coumans 2012, 120). They started riding highly over a commodity which is unprecedentedly booming and therefore funding adequacy hardly was a problem. But the DI members chose lobbying the government in Canada for providing with funds and support through the CIDA (Canadian International development agency). Money was desired by these mining company earmarked as ODA for funding their CSR initiatives, without submission to any newer regulations. The Devonshir initiative’s approach preferred for governance across Canadian extractive industry depicted a soft corner in the government of harper. However this funding comes with a catch that all the mining companies should partner with NGOs in order for NGOs to be able to gain any fund. Therefore, the strategy has a weakness of not being able to foster sustainable development.