英国论文迟交：宏观经济预测
定期编制和公布宏观经济预测是发达工业化国家中央银行之间的共同活动。这些预测受到了分析师、市场参与者和金融媒体的极大关注。在采取了明确的通胀预测目标策略的央行中，这些预测在内部决策过程中发挥着核心作用，因为在许多情况下，政策的设置是为了在指定的时间范围内实现一定的通胀目标。这些预测也被视为央行沟通政策中的一个重要因素。更广泛地说，用欧洲央行的话来说，“宏观经济预测作为收集和组织有关当前和未来经济发展的现有信息的工具发挥着重要作用”(欧洲央行，2001)。然而，央行并不是唯一的预测机构，有不同的预测机构，如专业预测和市场预测要素的预测机构。
英国论文迟交：宏观经济预测
在过去的20年中，一些国家已经采用通货膨胀目标制作为货币政策的框架，中央银行的通货膨胀预测已经成为利率制定的目标(Svensson, 1997)。如果可以断言，央行的预测模型是对经济中真正的通胀过程的一个很好的近似，而且通胀是平稳的，没有间歇性的制度变动，那么这将有利于预测目标。在这些假设下，通胀预测失败的可能性非常小。本研究试图了解，在中国人民银行(PBC)或中国人民银行(PBOC)的情况下，央行研究中所持有的这种预测准确性是否也适用。中国人民银行是中华人民共和国的中央银行，有权控制中国大陆的货币政策和监管金融机构。
英国论文迟交：宏观经济预测
The periodic construction and publication of macroeconomic forecasts is a common activity among central banks in advanced industrialized economies. Those forecasts get considerable attention from analysts, market participants and the financial press. Among the central banks that have adopted an explicit inflation-forecast targeting strategy those forecasts play a central role in the internal decision process for, in many cases, policy settings are chosen in order to attain a certain inflation target at a specified horizon. Those forecasts are also viewed as an important element in central banks’ communication policy. More generally, and using the words of the ECB, “macroeconomic projections play an important role as a tool for aggregating and organizing existing information on current and future economic developments” (European Central Bank, 2001). However, the central banks are not the only forecasting institutions, there are different forecasting institutions such as that of the Professional and market forecast elements.
英国论文迟交：宏观经济预测
Over the past two decades, several countries have adopted inflation targeting as a framework for monetary policy and the central banks inflation forecasts have become the target for interest rate setting, (Svensson, 1997). It would be favorable for forecast targeting if it could be asserted that the central bank’s forecasting model is a good approximation to the true inflation process in the economy and that inflation is stationary and without intermittent regime shifts. Under these assumptions, there would be very few inflations forecast failures. This research attempts to understand if such forecast accuracy as held in research with respect to central banks will also hold true in the case of the People’s Bank of China (PBC or PBOC). The PBC is the central bank of the People’s Republic of China with the power to control monetary policy and regulate financial institutions in mainland China.