该产品被认为符合AMI客户的需求，因为它考虑了合同的更新。然而，由于它在服务和产品功能上的地位比AMI (Reimann et al.， 2017)更强大，所以Easton的权力地位发生了变化。因此，Easton组织声称市场地位导致了价格的变化，从成本加到价值定价。然而，谈判后来导致伊斯顿公司以增加的百分比提供成本加公式。
利润率从4.5%上升到14%，这使得Easton成为三家供应XPX (Wang et al.， 2014)的供应商中最昂贵的供应商。这种情况下提供了理解,虽然高质量的服务和有效的产品功能将受到AMI的新的合同,成本效益的因素已经消除了由于增加权力伊斯顿的位置作为供应商比AMI买家(丽塔和Krapfel,2015)。因此，AMI和Easton的权力关系可以被看作是低权力地位和高权力地位，因为在这种情况下，Easton可以对AMI施加影响。这些影响可以进一步说明组件交付的质量和时间轴。
This product was found to be suitable as per the needs of the customers by AMI due to which it considered renewal of the contract. However, the power position of Easton had changed since it became a market leader on the service and product functionality due to which it had increased power position than AMI (Reimann et al., 2017). Hence, it was asserted by the organization of Easton that the market position has resulted in the change of pricing from the cost plus to value pricing. However, the negotiations later resulted in Easton to offer the cost plus formula at an increased percentage.
The profit margin was increased from 4.5% to 14% which makes Easton the most expensive supplier among the three that supplies XPX (Wang et al., 2014). This case provides the understanding that although high quality service and effective product functionality will be received by AMI with the renewed contract, the factor of cost benefit has been eliminated due to the increased power position of Easton as a supplier than the AMI as buyer (Rita and Krapfel, 2015). Therefore, the power relation of AMI and Easton can be seen as the low power position and high power position due to which Easton can exert influence over AMI related to the cost as evident from the case. The influences can further be about quality and timelines for component delivery.